“Legalizing the Loot: A Counter-Bill to Protect National Integrity”

 📰 Title:

“Legalizing the Loot: A Counter-Bill to Protect National Integrity”

English Translation

Mr. Atrees Abu El-Dahab, leader of the parliamentary majority, confirmed the government’s rejection of the “Transparency of Corruption” bill submitted by independent MP Awad El-Howeit for parliamentary debate and approval.

Abu El-Dahab argued that the proposed law would tarnish Egypt’s pristine image of governmental integrity and its honorable record of upright officials—past and present—under the leadership of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.

He added that El-Howeit’s proposal would be ineffective due to its lengthy, gradual implementation phases, which could risk collapse should the current “golden era” change and the state’s firm grip weaken in enforcing it. This concern is especially pressing, he noted, given that corrupt actors possess vast experience in manipulating laws and exploiting loopholes through networks allegedly entrenched for more than seventy years.

Abu El-Dahab further announced that the government will introduce a counter-bill next week to resolve the controversy with a comprehensive and practical solution to Egypt’s intractable economic crisis.

The proposed solution: to legalize and settle public theft and embezzlement committed over the past seventy years by issuing legislation that would regularize these crimes—on the condition that 50% of the stolen funds be returned to the public treasury and that such acts not be considered offenses against honor.

As for present and future public looting, it would be permitted provided that 75% of the proceeds are transferred to the state.

In-Depth Analysis for International Readers

1. The Satirical Escalation

This text builds upon an earlier satirical premise—regulating corruption—and pushes it further into institutional absurdity.

The previous proposal suggested gradually reducing corruption through structured limits.

This new counter-proposal discards gradual reform entirely and instead moves toward formal legalization of theft.

The escalation is deliberate.

Satire here operates by logical intensification:

If corruption cannot realistically be eliminated, why not integrate it into fiscal policy?

2. Reversal of Moral Categories

The text performs a radical inversion:

Crime becomes policy.

Embezzlement becomes settlement.

Looting becomes revenue-sharing.

By proposing that past crimes be regularized in exchange for partial repayment, the satire mirrors real-world amnesty or reconciliation frameworks—but applies them not to political reconciliation or tax evasion, but to systemic theft.

The most striking phrase is the declaration that such acts would be considered “not dishonorable.”

Here, legal language overwrites moral judgment.

3. The “Golden Era” Irony

The reference to the “golden era” under President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi adds another layer of irony.

The speaker argues that transparency could damage Egypt’s reputation for integrity—an assertion that stands in tension with the very need to regulate corruption.

The logic is circular:

Corruption must not be exposed because it would harm the image of integrity.

This rhetorical move is central to authoritarian satire:

image management replaces structural reform.

4. Corruption as Historical Continuity

By referring to networks entrenched for seventy years, the text universalizes blame across generations.

This serves two satirical functions:

It dilutes responsibility.

It suggests that corruption is so historic and systemic that reform seems naïve.

The counter-proposal then reframes corruption not as a deviation from the state—but as part of its administrative tradition.

5. The Mathematics of Moral Compromise

The percentages are key:

50% repayment for past theft.

75% state share for present and future looting.

This resembles taxation more than criminal justice.

The satire exposes a terrifying hypothetical:

What if corruption were simply formalized as a revenue stream?

At that point, the distinction between public office and private enrichment collapses.

6. Bureaucratic Tone, Radical Content

Like the previous text, this piece uses:

Calm procedural language

Legislative vocabulary

Technical phrasing

There is no outrage.

No emotional accusation.

The horror emerges from the normalcy of the tone.

7. Universal Dimensions

Though set in an Egyptian context, the satire resonates globally.

In many countries, political scandals end with:

Settlements

Partial repayments

Plea bargains

Administrative adjustments

This text exaggerates that pattern into a full system of legalized plunder.

It asks an unsettling question:

If corruption becomes predictable, quantifiable, and revenue-generating, does it cease to be corruption?

Or does it simply become governance?

8. Philosophical Core

The piece interrogates the boundary between legality and morality.

Law is presented not as a guardian of ethics, but as a tool capable of redefining ethics.

If parliament can declare looting “not dishonorable,”

then honor itself becomes legislatively adjustable.

Conclusion

This satire does not accuse specific individuals.

Instead, it imagines a political order that responds to corruption not by eradicating it—but by institutionalizing it.

The result is darkly comic and intellectually sharp.

Because the proposal sounds administratively coherent.

And that is precisely what makes it dangerous.

If you would like, I can now:

Combine the previous corruption text and this one into a single international feature essay

Or frame them within a comparative study of political satire and legal absurdism

Or craft a sharper, magazine-style version aimed at literary publications

Tell me your target outlet and audience.

"Government Rejects Corruption Transparency, Proposes Amnesty for 70 Years of Theft: Pay 50% and Keep Your Honor"

A Satirical Text by Al-Nadim Al-Raqmi (The Digital Nadim)

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Atris Abu Al-Dahab, the Majority Leader in the House of Representatives, confirmed the government's rejection of the corruption transparency bill submitted by independent MP Awad Al-Huwait for discussion and approval by the council. Abu Al-Dahab considered that this law "distorts Egypt's bright image of governmental integrity and its honorable record of the integrity of current and former officials during the era of President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi."

Abu Al-Dahab added that Al-Huwait's law "would not bear fruit due to the length of its phased implementation," which could lead to its collapse if "this golden era of President Sisi changes and the state's grip weakens" in applying it strictly and firmly—especially since corrupt individuals have immense capabilities to manipulate laws, evade their provisions, and exploit known loopholes through corruption networks entrenched for over seventy years.

Abu Al-Dahab announced that the government will submit, within the coming week, a counter-bill that will settle this dispute with a comprehensive vision presenting the optimal, easiest, practical, and realistic solution to Egypt's chronic economic crisis: namely, legalizing the crimes of theft and public plunder over the past seventy years by issuing legislation to settle these crimes, provided that 50% of the proceeds are returned to the public treasury and that they are considered "not dishonorable." As for current and future public plunder, it will be permitted provided that 75% of it is transferred to the state.

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Literary, Political, and Economic Analysis: When Theft Becomes a National Heritage

I. Introduction: The State as Silent Partner in Corruption

This text by the pseudonymous Egyptian satirist "Al-Nadim Al-Raqmi" represents the second installment of his corruption saga, following MP Awad Al-Huwait's proposal to gradually legalize corruption. If the previous text satirized "reformist" approaches to corruption, this one presents the regime's response—and it is far more terrifying. The government does not merely reject gradual reform; it proposes a comprehensive amnesty for seventy years of theft, transforming corruption from a crime into a taxed and regulated industry.

For the international reader, this text offers a devastating glimpse into how entrenched corruption becomes normalized, legalized, and even celebrated as national policy. It reveals the logic of a state that has given up fighting corruption and instead decided to profit from it.

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II. Literary Analysis: The Rhetoric of Rejection and the Satire of the "Counter-Bill"

1. The New Character: "Atris Abu Al-Dahab" – Majority Leader

The text introduces a new character in Al-Nadim's universe: Atris Abu Al-Dahab (literally "Atris, Father of Gold"). The name carries layered satirical meanings:

· Atris: A colloquial Egyptian name with rustic or Upper Egyptian connotations, suggesting toughness and populist appeal—but here, it satirizes the "folk" politician who pretends to represent the common people.

· Abu Al-Dahab: "Father of Gold," implying wealth, or perhaps that the man is "golden" in his loyalty to the regime. The name suggests a populist millionaire, the archetype of the parliamentarian who speaks for the "majority" while belonging to the minority of beneficiaries.

This character embodies the regime's mouthpiece: he rejects the opposition's proposal not by defending principles but by exposing the regime's own cynical logic.

2. The Architecture of Rejection

The government's rejection is built on three satirical pillars:

· First reason: "Distorting Egypt's bright image." The phrase "bright image" is a parody of official discourse that insists on Egypt's integrity despite all evidence. The satire exposes the gap between official rhetoric and reality.

· Second reason: Fear for the law's future if the "golden era" ends. This is a stunning admission: the law would only work under Sisi's "iron grip." It implicitly acknowledges that corruption is rampant and can only be controlled by dictatorship—and even then, the regime fears its own successors.

· Third reason: The power of corrupt networks "entrenched for over seventy years." This is an admission that corruption is not a recent phenomenon but a structural feature of the Egyptian state since the 1952 revolution.

3. "The Golden Era" – Historical Irony

The phrase "this golden era of President Sisi" is biting historical satire. In official media, Sisi's era is described as one of achievement and development. Here, "golden" is used in the context of fighting corruption—suggesting that the era's "gold" might refer to the tightness of the regime's grip, not its economic or social accomplishments.

4. The Counter-Bill: Turning the Tables

The satirical climax is the government's proposed counter-bill. If Al-Huwait's law called for "phased transparency of corruption," the government's law goes much further:

· Legalizing crimes of theft and public plunder over the past seventy years (i.e., since the 1952 revolution).

· Returning only 50% to the public treasury (amnesty for the other half).

· Declaring these crimes "not dishonorable" (erasing the stain of shame).

· Permitting current and future plunder in exchange for 75% going to the state.

This is not a law against corruption; it is a comprehensive amnesty for all past corruption, with a built-in profit-sharing mechanism for future corruption. The state becomes a silent partner in crime.

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III. Political Analysis: The State as Beneficiary of Corruption

1. From Fighting Corruption to Sharing the Spoils

The text reveals a fundamental shift in the concept of the state:

· Traditional state: fights corruption, punishes the corrupt.

· State in the text: negotiates with the corrupt over its share of the spoils (75% for the state, 25% for the corrupt).

This means the state is no longer an adversary of corruption but a partner in it. Corruption becomes an organized economic sector with defined percentages, subject to taxation (the 75%).

2. "Seventy Years" – The Indictment of Modern Egyptian History

The choice of "the past seventy years" is not arbitrary. It covers the period from the 1952 revolution to the present. This is a sweeping indictment of every regime that has ruled Egypt: Nasser, Sadat, Mubarak, the transitional period, and the current regime.

The message: corruption is not a recent aberration but a constant companion of governance in modern Egypt. All regimes have participated, all bear responsibility.

3. "Not Dishonorable" – Erasing the Stigma

The phrase "considered not dishonorable" is the most dangerous element in the text. In Egyptian law, certain crimes are considered "dishonorable" (mukhilla bil-sharaf) and disqualify the perpetrator from political rights (such as running for parliament). Proposing to declare corruption crimes "not dishonorable" means political rehabilitation for the corrupt.

This would allow major corrupt figures to:

· Run for parliament.

· Hold public office.

· Claim the people's trust.

It is a moral cleansing of corruption's history.

4. The Role of the "Majority Leader"

Atris Abu Al-Dahab functions as the regime's voice in parliament, defending the government and attacking the opposition. But in his defense, he reveals more than he conceals. He admits the state's weakness before corruption networks, admits that the law would only work under Sisi's "iron grip," and thereby exposes the authoritarian nature of the regime that claims to be fighting corruption.

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IV. Economic Analysis: The Rentier State and the Taxation of Theft

1. The 75% Rule: Taxing Corruption

The proposal to transfer 75% of current and future plunder to the state means that corruption becomes a revenue source for the state. This is a complete inversion of logic:

· Instead of losing 100% of corruption funds (which leave the formal economy), the state recovers 75%.

· The corrupt keep 25% as a "commission" for their illegal work.

This resembles taxation of illegal drugs in some countries: if you can't eliminate the phenomenon, regulate it and tax it. But drugs harm users, while corruption harms all citizens.

2. Amnesty for the Past: The Cost of Forgiveness

Amnesty for 50% of the theft of seventy years means the state waives its right to recover billions that were stolen. This money could have built hospitals, schools, and infrastructure. The text reveals that the regime prefers an alliance with the corrupt over recovering the people's money.

3. "Public Plunder" as a Legal Term

The use of "public plunder" (al-nahb al-'amm) instead of "corruption" or "theft" is a precise linguistic choice. "Plunder" suggests violence and looting, and "public" indicates it is directed against public funds. The term combines the gravity of the crime (plunder) with its scope (public).

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V. Social Analysis: Corruption as Social Fabric

1. "Corruption Networks Entrenched for Over Seventy Years"

This admission (from the majority leader himself) is a self-indictment of the system. Corruption networks are not recent; they are extended across decades, meaning they have become part of Egypt's social and economic fabric.

These networks include:

· Current and former officials.

· Businessmen.

· Middlemen and informants.

· Low-level and high-level employees.

Corruption is no longer individual behavior but an integrated social system with its own rules and unwritten laws.

2. "Egypt's Bright Image" Between Rhetoric and Reality

The phrase "Egypt's bright image of governmental integrity" is a satirical mimicry of official media discourse. In reality, Egypt ranks low on international transparency indices. The text exposes the gap between the proclaimed image and actual reality.

3. "The Integrity of Officials" as an Empty Phrase

Talk of "Egypt's honorable record of officials' integrity" is an ethical use of language in an unethical context. "Honor" here becomes a mere word, unrelated to officials' actual behavior.

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VI. The Text in the Context of Al-Nadim Al-Raqmi's Project

This text forms, with the previous one (Al-Huwait's proposal), an integrated diptych:

Text Speaker Proposal Level

Al-Huwait's Proposal Opposition Gradual regulation of corruption Satirical reformism

Abu Al-Dahab's Response Government Retroactive legalization of corruption Satirical defeatism

If Al-Huwait satirizes reformers, Abu Al-Dahab satirizes the regime itself. The regime doesn't want reform, even satirical reform. It wants to entrench the status quo while wrapping it in legal legitimacy.

The corruption-themed texts in Al-Nadim's project can be sequenced as:

1. Shablanga: Establishing the parallel world of corruption.

2. Mayor Abdel Shakour: Linking local corruption to global networks.

3. Al-Huwait's Proposal: Regulating corruption (reformist perspective).

4. Abu Al-Dahab's Response: Legalizing corruption (regime perspective).

This sequence reveals an integrated vision of corruption: from foundation to globalization to regulation to legalization.

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VII. Legal and Constitutional Analysis: Satire of Legislation

1. The "Corruption Transparency Bill"

This title is inherently contradictory. Transparency means disclosure and openness, while corruption means concealment and deception. Combining them in a bill's title satirizes the language of legislation, which uses glossy words to cover dark content.

2. "Not Dishonorable" in Egyptian Law

In Egyptian law, there is a distinction between crimes that are "dishonorable" (mukhilla bil-sharaf) and those that are not. Dishonorable crimes (such as theft, bribery, forgery) disqualify the perpetrator from certain political rights. Proposing to declare corruption crimes "not dishonorable" is a fundamental shift in the legal-ethical framework.

This means major corrupt figures could:

· Run for parliament.

· Hold public office.

· Claim the people's trust.

3. Retroactive Legalization

Laws typically apply to the future, not the past. But this proposal applies retroactively, meaning it grants amnesty for crimes already committed. This contradicts the principle of non-retroactivity of laws, but the text satirizes the idea that the regime is committed to legal principles anyway.

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VIII. Conclusion: When Corruption Becomes the System

This text is a dark peak in Al-Nadim Al-Raqmi's project. It does not merely critique corruption; it exposes the regime's own logic:

1. The regime admits its weakness: corruption networks are stronger than the law and can only be controlled by repression.

2. The regime allies with the corrupt: instead of fighting them, it shares the spoils.

3. The regime legalizes the past: amnesty for past thefts means corruption was part of state-building.

4. The regime institutionalizes the future: corruption will continue, but under state supervision and with a profit-sharing system.

The deeper message: Corruption in Egypt is not a malfunction to be fixed; it is the system of governance itself. When the government rejects a bill to regulate corruption and instead proposes a bill to legalize it, this means corruption is no longer a crime but an unwritten constitution.

The phrase "transferring 75% to the state" is the conceptual bomb: corruption becomes a tax, and the state becomes a partner in plunder. And the phrase "considered not dishonorable" is the death certificate of ethics: the corrupt become honorable, and the honest are the fools who didn't steal.

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IX. Translation Notes for International Readers

Key Cultural References:

Arabic Term Translation Explanation

غير مخلة بالشرف Not dishonorable Legal concept distinguishing crimes that disqualify from political rights

سبعين عاماً Seventy years Period since the 1952 revolution, covering all modern Egyptian regimes

زعيم الأغلبية Majority Leader Parliamentary position representing the ruling bloc

العهد الذهبي Golden era Satirical reference to official discourse glorifying the current era

النهب العام Public plunder Deliberately strong term for large-scale corruption

Suggested Title Variations:

1. "The State's New Business Model: 75% for Us, 25% for You – Legalizing Corruption in Egypt"

2. "Seventy Years of Theft Forgiven: Egypt's Amnesty Bill and the Taxation of Plunder"

3. "How to Make Corruption Honorable: Egypt's Solution to the Economic Crisis"

4. "The Corrupt's Charter: Egypt Proposes Profit-Sharing with Thieves"

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X. Why This Text Matters for International Publication

This text, like others by Al-Nadim Al-Raqmi, represents a significant contribution to global political satire. It belongs alongside:

· Jonathan Swift's "A Modest Proposal" (suggesting the poor sell their children as food).

· Franz Kafka's "The Trial" (bureaucratic absurdity and guilt).

· George Orwell's "Animal Farm" (corruption of revolutionary ideals).

· Mikhail Bulgakov's "The Master and Margarita" (the devil in Moscow).

What makes this text unique:

1. It satirizes not just corruption, but the state's response to it – exposing how regimes adapt to and profit from systemic rot.

2. It uses legislative language as a weapon – mimicking the form of laws to reveal their potential for evil.

3. It connects past and present – showing corruption as a historical constant, not a recent deviation.

4. It offers no hope – the darkest satire acknowledges that some systems cannot be reformed, only exposed.

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"Parliament approved the Historical Corruption Settlement Bill with a unanimous vote. Deputies congratulated each other: at last, the past is safe. The corrupt celebrated in Cairo's hotels: honor has returned to us. The people looked to the sky: when will our turn come?"

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For Publishers and Literary Agents:

This text is part of a larger collection of satirical works by Al-Nadim Al-Raqmi that deserve international attention. The author's voice is urgent, brilliant, and necessary—a chronicler of collapse disguised as a comedian, an ethnographer of scarcity wrapped in parody. For rights inquiries, manuscript submissions, or translation requests, please contact through established secure channels.

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This analysis was prepared for academic and publishing purposes. The text and its interpretation are offered as a window into contemporary Arabic political satire and the resilience of critical thought under constrained conditions.